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Abstract
The problem of device-independent randomness amplification against no-signaling adversaries
has so far been studied under the assumption that the weak source of randomness is uncorrelated
with the (quantum) devices used in the amplification procedure. In this work, we relax this
assumption, and reconsider the original protocol of Colbeck and Renner using a Santha-Vazirani
(SV) source. To do so, we introduce an SV-like condition for devices, namely that any string
of SV source bits remains weakly random conditioned upon any other bit string from the same
SV source and the outputs obtained when this further string is input into the devices. Assuming
this condition, we show that a quantum device using a singlet state to violate the chained Bell
inequalities leads to full randomness in the asymptotic scenario of a large number of settings, for
a restricted set of SV sources (with 0 ≤ ε < (2(1/12) − 1)/(2(2(1/12) + 1)) ≈ 0.0144). We also
study a device-independent protocol that allows for correlations between the sequence of boxes
used in the protocol and the SV source bits used to choose the particular box from whose output
the randomness is obtained. Assuming the SV-like condition for devices, we show that the honest
parties can achieve amplification of the weak source, for the parameter range 0 ≤ ε < 0.0132,
against a class of attacks given as a mixture of product box sequences, made of extremal no-
signaling boxes, with additional symmetry conditions. Composable security proof against this
class of attacks is provided.
Keywords: randomness, randomness amplification, quantum information, Santha-Vazirani source
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1 Introduction
In many applications, like numerical simulations, cryptography or gambling, just to name a few, free
randomness is desired due to the fact that a wide range of results is based on it. In practice, however,
random sources are rarely private and only partially weak sources of randomness are available. That
is why the problem of randomness amplification became useful and worth investigating. Overall, the
idea is to use the inputs from a partially random source and obtain perfectly random output bits.
In classical information theory, randomness amplification from a single weak source is unattainable
([19]). However, it becomes possible, if the no-signaling principle is assumed and quantum-mechanical
correlations are used. Such correlations are revealed operationally through the violation of Bell
inequalities.
As a model of a weak source to be amplified, we consider an ε-SV source (named after Santha
and Vazirani [19]), where ε is a parameter which indicates how far we are from full randomness. An
ε-SV source is given by a probability distribution P (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . .) over bit strings such that
(0.5− ε) ≤ P (ϕ1|e) ≤ (0.5 + ε),
(0.5− ε) ≤ P (ϕi+1|ϕ1, . . . , ϕi, e) ≤ (0.5 + ε)
(1.1)
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where e represents an arbitrary random variable prior to ϕ1, which can influence
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . .. Note that, when ε = 0, bits are fully random, while they can be even fully deter-
ministic when ε = 0.5. For brevity, throughout the rest of the paper we will write p− for (0.5 − ε)
and p+ for (0.5 + ε).
In the research on randomness amplification, the paper of Colbeck and Renner [7] is certainly
crucial. It is also a starting point for our idea. The authors consider the bipartite scenario of the
chained Bell inequality and prove that, under certain assumptions (discussed later), it is possible
to amplify randomness of ε-SV sources, provided that ε <
(√
2− 1)2 /2 ≈ 0.086. The result may
be improved, as is done in [11]. There, based on the observation that extremal points of the set
of probability distributions from an ε-SV source are certain permutations of Bernoulli distributions
with parameter (0.5 − ε), randomness amplification is obtained for any ε < 0.0961. Moreover, the
bound is shown to be tight, which means that under these assumptions, it is not possible to achieve
randomness amplification using the chained Bell inequality above this threshold.
Gallego et al. [8] show that, given an ε-SV source, with any 0 < ε < 0.5, and assuming no-
signaling, full randomness may be certified using quantum non-local correlations. In [8], the Bell
scenario of five-party Mermin inequality is considered, however, unlike in the protocol proposed in
[7], the hashing function used to compute the final random bit is not explicitly provided and a large
number of space-like separated devices is required.
Further results were obtained in [16], [5], [2], [17], [6] etc., a wide range of protocols have been
proposed, these are summarized and compared in Table I in [2]. The problem has been considered
from different points of view and a lot of obstacles, such as the requirement of an infinite number
of devices or no tolerance for noise, have already been overcome. However, relaxing the assumption
about independence between a source and a device has not yet been widely studied, especially in the
context of a finite device framework against a no-signaling adversary.
In this paper, we relax this assumption, i.e., do not require a source and a device to be inde-
pendent. Instead, we only limit the correlations between them by one constraint, which we call the
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SV-condition for boxes and specify in details later. We prove explicitly that the most malicious cor-
relations (between a source and a device) are not allowed due to the assumption that an ε-SV source
remains an ε-SV source even upon obtaining the inputs and outputs from boxes. Hence, randomness
amplification is still possible. Our new method of proof allows to analyze an attack where an ad-
versary sends to the honest parties those boxes that are particularly adapted to their measurement
settings, as well as to the hashing function applied. We explain the dangers of such attacks with an
explicit example in Section 3.
So far, only Chung et al. have tried to weaken the independence assumption. In [5] they approach
the problem in a quantum formalism, while in [6], which was announced later than the first version
of this paper, they prove (in the similar spirit) security against no-signaling adversaries, although
using a larger number of devices. Our approach is different and independent from the one proposed
by Chung et al. in [5] and [6]. We believe that the results obtained within this paper give a new
insight into the research on randomness amplification and, due to the clarity of assumptions, will also
be significant in the more general task of obtaining secure key bits in cryptography.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some basic notations and definitions.
A motivation for the paper is described in Section 3 with a toy example of an attack strategy for
the adversary. In Section 4 we formally state the assumptions considered in the paper and discuss
the results for a single no-signaling box. Section 5 is devoted to the explicit example of the chained
Bell inequality, which is interesting because it may be compared with the results of Colbeck and
Renner [7]. Further, within Section 6, we estimate a composable distance (for a private weak source
of randomness) between a fully random bit and an output bit of a box. In Section 7 we revisit
the Colbeck and Renner protocol for amplification of randomness using the chained Bell inequality.
A general class of attacks exhibiting certain kind of symmetry and having limited correlations between
the runs of the device (see Sections 8.3 and 8.4 for the detailed description of the assumptions on the
attack strategy) is considered within Section 8. We prove (in a composable way for private sources)
that under the relaxed assumption, against this class of attacks, the protocol allows for amplification
in the parameter range 0 ≤ ε < 0.0132. Finally, in Section 9, we summarize our results and raise just
a few open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 No-signaling boxes
In our study we use a family of probability distributions, usually called a box, denoted by P (O|I),
where I and O are random variables describing the vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively.
To talk about randomness amplification, it is advisable to explain what is meant by the no-
signaling condition. In the simplest case, when there are only two parties: Alice and Bob, the
no-signaling assumption is that
∑
y
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v)) =
∑
y
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v′)),
∑
x
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v)) =
∑
x
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u′, v))
(2.1)
for every u, u′, v, v′, x, y, where u, u′ and v, v′ denote the inputs of Alice and Bob, respectively, while
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x and y denote their outputs.
2.2 Bell values observed in laboratories
Theoretically, there may exist no-signaling boxes which attain the algebraic violation of the chosen
Bell inequality. However, as for now, we are able to use in laboratories only these boxes which violate
the inequality up to the value obtained within the rules of quantum mechanics. This simply means
that the Bell value observed in a lab may not be lower (here a larger violation is characterized by a
smaller value for the Bell expression) than the value predicted by quantum mechanics.
2.3 Bell inequalities useful for randomness amplification
It is well-known that quantum mechanics allows for non-local correlations between spatially separated
systems. Occurrence of such correlations can be verified through the violation of Bell inequalities. The
convex set formed by the correlations described by quantum theory is sandwiched between the sets
of classical and general no-signaling correlations. Only extremal boxes (vertices) of the no-signaling
polytope are completely uncorrelated with the environment and hence provide intrinsic certified
randomness. It has been recently proven in [18] that non-local vertices of the no-signaling polytopes
of correlations admit no quantum realization. For amplification of SV sources, Bell inequalities with
the property that the optimal quantum value equals the optimal no-signaling value are required. For
such Bell inequalities (e.g. GHZ paradoxes [10], pseudo-telepathy games [9] or Bell inequalities for
graph states [12]), or those where the quantum violation is close to algebraic (such as the chained
Bell inequality [3]), the quantum set reaches the corresponding facet of the no-signaling polytope.
In this paper we mainly focus on the chained Bell inequality, which has already been used in the
research on randomness and privacy amplification (see [7], [11] or [1]).
3 Motivation and a toy example
We now exemplify a possible attack that utilizes correlations between a weak source and device in the
simplest scenario of boxes with binary inputs and outputs. Even though these boxes do not constitute
a resource for randomness amplification, the attack can already be described in terms of these.
Imagine that Alice and Bob share a box L which is a mixture of local boxes Lij , where i = 1, 3
labels Alice’s inputs and j = 2, 4 labels Bob’s inputs:
L =
1
4
(L12 + L32 + L34 + L14) . (3.1)
(See Fig. 1 where the PR box and local deterministic boxes are presented and Fig. 2, where the
boxes Lij are given explicitly). The bits from an ε-SV source are perfectly correlated to local boxes
as
P (Lij |S = (k, l)) = δik;jl =
{
1, i = k & j = l,
0, otherwise,
(3.2)
where S is the random variable describing bits from an ε-SV source.
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Figure 1: Examples of bipartite boxes with binary inputs and outputs denoted by graphs. The
Popescu-Rohrlich box (on the left) and local (deterministic) boxes (on the right). The graphs should
be read in the following way: solid (dashed) lines between arbitrary vertices u and v imply that,
given the input I = (u, v), the output bits are perfectly correlated (anti-correlated) with probability
1. This means that e.g. the Popescu-Rohrlich box presented in this figure is determined by the
following correlations: P (O = (0, 0)|I = (1, 2)) = P (O = (1, 1)|I = (1, 2)) = 0.5, P (O = (0, 0)|I =
(3, 2)) = P (O = (1, 1)|I = (3, 2)) = 0.5, P (O = (0, 0)|I = (3, 4)) = P (O = (1, 1)|I = (3, 4)) =
0.5, P (O = (0, 1)|I = (1, 4)) = P (O = (1, 0)|I = (1, 4)) = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Bits from an ε-SV source (on the left) are perfectly correlated with local boxes supplied
to honest parties (on the right). Correlations described by Eq. (3.2) are indicated by blue arrows.
Additionally, bits from an ε-SV source are perfectly correlated with the inputs to boxes (see Eq.
(3.3)), which is indicated by black arrows. These correlations allow only for measuring green edges
and hence Alice and Bob always observe an optimal Bell value. If red edges could be measured, the
locality of boxes would be detected.
In the protocols proposed so far such as [7], [11], it is demanded that I and S are perfectly
correlated, i.e.
P (I = (u, v)|S = (k, l)) = δuk;vl =
{
1, u = k & v = l,
0, otherwise,
(3.3)
which means that bits the from the ε-SV source are used as inputs to the box. All the correlations
are indicated in Fig. 2. Now, we see that although the box L is manifestly local, the honest parties
do not detect it in the protocols proposed so far. Indeed, correlations (3.2) and (3.3) imply that input
I = (k, l) may only be introduced to box Lkl, adapted exactly to this input, so that L mimics the
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Figure 3: A priori we allow arbitrary correlations between a source and a box (left). To illustrate
how malicious these correlations may be, we recall the example described in Section 3 (right). Bits
from an ε-SV source determine from which box the final output bit is taken. In general, arbitrary
input bits may be introduced to the box. The illustration for other Bell inequalities may be more
complicated, but the idea is the same.
action of the PR box on any input. On the other hand, if there was independence between the ε-SV
source and the boxes, the parties would recognize that the object L is local.
To conclude, this toy example clearly illustrates that perfect correlation of inputs and devices
excludes any possibility of randomness amplification. To circumvent this type of attack, we introduce
the SV-condition for boxes, which is the weakest assumption (thus far) that still allows for randomness
amplification.
In the next section we show that the SV-condition for boxes implies the following: if the Bell
value observed by the honest parties (δobs) is small, then the true Bell value (δtrue) is also small.
In Section 5 we apply the whole reasoning to the chained Bell inequality. Finally, in Section 6, we
estimate a composable distance between a bit obtained from a single box and a fully random bit.
The bound is given as a function of δobs and n (the number of input pairs considered in the chained
Bell inequality).
4 SV-condition for no-signaling boxes and the relation between the
true and the observed Bell value
4.1 Correlations between the source and the device: boxes determined by the
source
Let S denote a random variable which describes an arbitrary portion of subsequent bits from an
ε-SV source. Recall that we write I and O for variables which describe the inputs and outputs of
the device, respectively. Suppose that bits from an ε-SV source are delivered and (simultaneously)
boxes, that are possibly correlated to them, are supplied. Hence, our object of study is
P (O|I, S). (4.1)
Note that S determines how the device acts inside (see Fig. 3).
Remark 4.1. Even if conditional distributions of the form P (O = o|I = i, S = s) are equal for
arbitrary o, i, s, joint distributions P (O = o, I = i, S = s) do not have to be the same. This is just
a fact which follows from conventional and meaningful way of thinking about any devices.
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4.2 SV-condition for boxes
Let us now precisely state the main assumption used in this paper, which we call the SV-condition
for boxes. Let S′ be a variable describing a portion of bits (disjoined from S) chosen from the
same ε-SV source, from which the input I to the device is taken. Note that we do not assume any
temporal ordering between S and S′. Let ηmin, ηmax ∈ (0, 1) be some functions of ε > 0 and |I|
(denoting the number of measurement settings). Although we a priori allow for arbitrary correlations
between the source and the device, there is one constraint which we impose, namely that if S′ = s′ is
input into the device with ηmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax, then S cannot be guessed perfectly even
after knowing the output O = o, i.e., for every realizations o, s, s′
ηmin ≤ P (S = s|O = o, S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax for S, S′
such that ηmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ηmax.
(4.2)
Remark 4.2. It should be noted that any conditional probability is well defined only if the event in
its condition is of non-zero probability. Therefore we can consider P (S = s|O = o, S′ = s′) only for
o and s′ such that P (O = o, S′ = s′) 6= 0, which means that for an input s′ we can obtain an output
o with some positive probability.
Remark 4.3. The distribution remains unchanged even if conditioned upon a variable e, which
represents some information prior to S′. To avoid unnecessary notation, we neglect it in the condition,
since it is irrelevant in what follows.
Assuming condition (4.2), which we henceforth call the SV-condition for boxes, we certainly
assume less than independence between the source and the device. Note that the SV-condition for
boxes is clearly violated in the toy example from Section 3. Indeed, suppose that there are some
testers who obtain further bits from the SV source denoted by the variable S′ (so that pmin ≤ P (S′ =
s′|S = s) ≤ pmax and conversely ζmin ≤ P (S = s|S′ = s′) ≤ ζmax for some ζmin, ζmax ∈ (0, 1), whose
explicit forms are derived in Appendix 9) and input them into the box. When they input S′ = s and
observe an output that does not mimic the PR box, which we denote by O 6= oPR, then due to the
perfect correlations between S and Lij they know that S 6= s, i.e., we have
P (S = s|S′ = s,O 6= oPR) = 0, (4.3)
which violates Eq. (4.2). Finally, note that taking S′ subsequently to S is just the worst case scenario
(since ζmin ≤ pmin ≤ pmax ≤ ζmax).
4.3 Comparing our assumptions with the assumptions of Chung, Shi and Wu
Let us now describe how the SV-condition for boxes, assumed in this paper, differs from what has been
assumed in other papers so far. Firstly, note that to retain the possibility of randomness amplification,
one has to necessarily make some assumptions on the correlations between the source and the device
(cf. the attack in Section 3). The intuition behind the possible assumptions is the following: no one
in the world should get to know the value of the bits from the SV source better than up to ε (of course
without revealing the bits themselves), even if conditioned upon any possible event in the universe.
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In particular, if we input a portion of bits from the SV source into any available device and record
the outputs, then still any other portion of bits should obey the SV source condition.
A stronger assumption that one may consider, is that for an input to the device that is inde-
pendent of the SV source, when conditioned on the output, the source should remain an SV source
(see Fig. 4 on the left). This condition is analogous to a similar condition on min-entropy sources,
which is derived from the assumption by Chung, Shi and Wu (CSW) in [5]. Namely, CSW consider a
quantum scenario, where the device D and the min-entropy source S are correlated as in the cq-state
ρSD,
ρSD :=
∑
s
P (S = s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ ρDs (4.4)
and they assume that the quantum conditional min-entropy Hmin(S|D)ρ of the source conditioned on
the device is greater than some constant k. This implies (see [15]) that for any POVM measurement
{Ms} performed by an agent on the quantum register D, the probability of the agent correctly
guessing S, Pguess(S|D), is upper bounded. The assumption of Chung, Shi and Wu thus implies that
for any input variable I independent of the source S, the probability Pguess(S|D) obeys
Pguess(S|D) =
∑
s
P (O = s|I = i)P (S = s|O = s, I = i) ≤ 2−k (4.5)
for all i. Correlations between the source and the device are also limited by the condition similar to
(4.5) in the more recent paper by Chung, Shi and Wu [6].
Condition (4.5) (whether in the scenario of a min-entropy source, or that of an SV source) has
the drawback of effectively introducing an agent that is not correlated with the weak source. However
we know that from two independent partially random sources one can extract perfect randomness
in the classical world. So the operational realization of the originally mathematical condition might
require the existence of an independent variable, implying the possibility of obtaining randomness
right from the source and the agent’s variable, if the latter’s distribution was not deterministic.
The most orthodox approach, which is free from the above drawback is the following: since
no-one in the world can choose a measurement of his/her own free will, the only way to choose it
is to use some weak source. This concept is used to weaken the original assumption (saying that,
conditioned on any measurement, an SV source stays the same). Namely, we imagine that an agent
draws bits from the SV source and chooses measurements according to these bits (see Fig. 4 on the
right). The new condition is clearly weaker than the original one, because it can be reduced to it (by
assuming that an SV source should stay the same for any joint distribution of choice of measurements
and bits from the source).
In this paper, we consider a somewhat intermediate scenario (see Fig. 4 in the middle): we
assume that the agent (which we call the "tester") has a variable which describes subsequent bits
drawn from the same SV source (so that his variable will not be necessarily independent of the other
portion of the SV source, used as input by the users who want to draw randomness). However, we
also assume that the device is correlated with the tester’s variable only through the users’ variable,
i.e. that for any o, i, s, s′ we have P (O = o|I = i, S = s, S′ = s′) = P (O = o|I = i, S = s).
This is a clearly weaker assumption than the SV-analogue of the CSW condition, since if we take
S′ to be independent of S, we obtain the SV-analogue of the CSW condition, while in our case this
condition need not be met, and the dependence between S′ and S may be chosen by an adversary. In
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Figure 4: (Left) The ε-SV source represented by the variable S is correlated to the device, so that
S determines the box. The SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(4.2) is verified using the additional source
of randomness, which is independent of the given ε-SV source. The figure corresponds to the SV-
analogue of the CSW condition. (Middle) The main part of the ε-SV source represented by the
variable S is correlated to the device. Other bits denoted by the variable Stest from the part of the
ε-SV source SVtest are correlated with the device only through the variable S. If bits are taken from
SVtest and used as inputs to the device, one can check whether the SV-condition for boxes is violated
or not. (Right) The desired scenario, in which the SV-condition for boxes is verified using the same
weak source of randomness, which is used by the honest parties in the protocol (probably a more
sophisticated testing procedure is required here.
other words, in the SV analogue of the CSW assumption, one requires that for some particular joint
distribution (with independent I and S), P (S|I,O) is still an SV source, irrespective of the protocol,
while in our case, the latter may hold for some other distribution, this time chosen adversarially for
any given protocol.
It should be noted that our reasoning, based on weakening the independence assumption, cannot
be applied to arbitrary min-entropy sources, since after gaining knowledge about some bits from a
general Hmin source, the rest of the bits need not constitute an Hmin source any more. On the other
hand, the CSW proof could still apply to block min-entropy sources (see [4]), i.e., sources that are
divided into blocks such that each block has a min-entropy at least k > 0, conditioned upon the
value of the other blocks. The investigation of the class of min-entropy sources for which the weaker
condition still allows for the possibility of randomness amplification and the applicability of the CSW
proof under this condition are left as open questions.
The threshold for the range of ε for which we will be able to amplify the SV source in the present
paper (obtained in Theorems 9.1 and 8.9) is weaker than the one obtained by Colbeck and Renner
in [7]. This however is only to be expected as the scenario considered in this paper is more general
than the scenario analyzed in [7], which was based on the assumption that the source and the device
are independent. While the protocols of [8], [2] and [17] achieve randomness amplification for the
entire range of ε and the latter two protocols also tolerate noise within a finite-device framework,
they also do so under the assumption of independence between source and device and are therefore
incomparable with the results in this paper.
4.4 Scenario
The scenario is as follows. There are: an ε-SV source and a device correlated to some portion of
subsequent bits from the source, described by the variable S (see Fig. 5). The honest parties draw
S = s from the source and use it as an input to the box, which means that S and IHP , the random
9
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O = o
IHP = sS = sSV
Figure 5: Bits from an ε-SV source are used by honest parties as inputs. The correlation is given by
Eq. (4.6).
variable describing the measurement settings of the honest parties, are perfectly correlated, i.e.
P (IHP = i|S = s) = δis for every i, s. (4.6)
The honest parties then test the statistics of a box for suitable violation of a certain Bell inequality.
4.5 The true and the observed Bell value
In the most general form, the Bell value is given by the formula
δ =
∑
o,i
P (O = o, I = i)B(i, o), (4.7)
where B is an indicator vector for the Bell inequality and P is an arbitrary joint probability distri-
bution. We specify it depending on the context.
We are particularly interested in evaluating the true Bell value, as it informs us whether the box
delivers randomness or not. Let I denote all the settings appearing in the Bell expression. The true
Bell value δtrue is calculated for variables Iindep, uniformly distributed (P (Iindep = i) = 1/|I|) and
independent from S. It is then defined as follows:
δtrue =
1
|I|
∑
o,i
P (O = o|Iindep = i)B(i, o), (4.8)
where |I| is the number of measurement settings.
Further, we define the observed Bell value, i.e. we write Eq. (4.7) for IHP , determined by Eq.
(4.6), and obtain
δobsHP =
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|IHP = s, S = s)B(s, o). (4.9)
The aim is to show that the true Bell value is small whenever the observed value is small, i.e.
the ratio δobsHP /δ
true
SV is controlled.
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4.6 Testing the SV-condition for boxes
Honest parties test the statistics of a box using a certain Bell inequality. There is a danger that they
may be cheated, as exemplified in Section 3. The ε-SV source can be correlated with the device, as
illustrated in Fig. 4.
Since the honest parties only input IHP which is perfectly correlated to S,
P (IHP = i|S = s) = δis, (4.10)
they are themselves not able to verify whether the SV-condition for boxes (4.2) is violated or not.
Therefore, we consider testers who have access to part of the ε-SV source (SVtest), described by the
variable Stest, which is correlated with the device only through the variable S and does not change
the statistics of a box P (O|I, S) (see Fig. 4, in the middle), i.e.
pmin ≤ P (Stest = s′|S = s) ≤ pmax for every s, s′ (4.11)
and
P (O|I, S, Stest) = P (O|I, S). (4.12)
Remark 4.4. Note that by assuming that an ε-SV source should stay the same for any joint distribu-
tion of choice of measurements and bits from the source, one can simply choose an independent source
of randomness as a testing part SVtest. Therefore the condition proposed in this paper, although a
bit technical, leads us to the desired scenario, in which the device is tested (in terms of satisfying the
SV-condition for boxes 4.2) using the same weak source of randomness, which is used by the honest
parties in the protocol (cf. Fig. 4).
When honest parties take the portion of bits S from the main part of source (they do not have
access to SVtest), to which the device is possibly correlated, the testers may be asked to perform the
measurement using their bits Stest as input, i.e.
P (Itest = i
′|Stest = s′) = δi′s′ . (4.13)
The overall picture is now the following. We have two different joint distributions P (O, I, S, Stest)
and
P (O, Itest, S, Stest). Conditional distributions are correlated as follows:
P (O = o|I = i, S = s, Stest = s′) Eq.(4.12)= P (O = o|I = i, S = s)
Remark 4.1
= P (O = o|Itest = i, S = s)
Eq.(4.12)
= P (O = o|Itest = i, S = s, Stest = s′)
(4.14)
for every o, i, i′, s, s′, where the pairs of variables I, S and Itest, Stest are each perfectly correlated. As
shown in Appendix 9, we have that Eq. (4.11) implies
ζmin ≤ P (S = s|Itest = s′) ≤ ζmax, (4.15)
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where ζmin and ζmax are functions of pmin, pmax and |I|, explicitly given by Eq. (9.2) in Appendix 9.
Due to the SV-condition for boxes (4.2) this gives that
ζmin ≤ P (S = s|Itest = s′, O = o) ≤ ζmax (4.16)
for every s, s′, o.
We now introduce an intermediate value between δobsHP and δ
true:
δtrueSV =
∑
o,s′
P (O = o, Itest = s
′)B(s′, o), (4.17)
where Itest is a random variable satisfying Eq. (4.11). Note that, according to the observation in
Remark 4.1 , we obtain
δtrue
Eq. (4.8)
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|Iindep = i, S = s)B(i, o)
Remark4.1
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
P (S = s)P (O = o, Itest = i, S = s)B(i, o)
P (Itest = i, S = s)
=
1
|I|
∑
o,i,s
P (O = o, Itest = i, S = s)B(i, o)
P (Itest = i|S = s)
(4.18)
and hence, according to Eq. (4.11) and the definition of δtrueSV in Eq.(4.17), we have
1
pmax|I|δ
true
SV ≤ δtrue ≤
1
pmin|I|δ
true
SV . (4.19)
4.7 Results and proofs
At this point, let us explicitly restate all the assumptions used in the paper for clarity:
1. There are spatially separated honest parties who share a no-signaling box, i.e., one constrained
by conditions Eq.(2.1).
2. Correlations between the source and the device are only limited by the SV-condition for boxes
(see Eq. (4.2)). The device is correlated to the main part of the source from which honest
parties draw their bits represented by variable S (see Eq. (4.6)).
3. There exists another part of the source, called SVtest, which may only be used (by testers) to
verify whether the SV-condition for boxes is violated. Stest drawn from SVtest is only correlated
with the device through the variable S and does not change the statistics of the box as given
in Eq.(4.12) (cf. Fig. 4 and Remark 4.4).
The main result of this Section is the following.
Theorem 4.5. Under assumptions 1-3 we obtain
δobsHP
δtrue
≥ |I|pminζmin
pmax
. (4.20)
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Proof. Note that Eqs. (4.16) and (4.11), as well as Remark 4.1, imply that
δobsHP
Eq. (4.9)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|IHP = s, S = s)B(s, o)
Remark4.1
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (O = o|Itest = s, S = s)B(s, o)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)
P (O = o, S = s|Itest = s)
P (S = s|Itest = s) B(s, o)
=
∑
o,s
P (S = s)P (Itest = s)
P (S = s, Itest = s)
P (S = s|O = o, Itest = s)
P (O = o|Itest = s)B(s, o)
Eq. (4.16)
≥ ζmin
∑
o,s
P (O = o, Itest = s)
P (Itest = s|S = s) B(s, o)
Eq. (4.11),Eq.(4.13)
≥ ζmin
pmax
∑
s,o
P (O = o, Itest = s)B(s, o)
Eq. (4.17)
=
ζmin
pmax
δtrueSV .
(4.21)
Referring to Eq. (4.19), we obtain
δobsHP ≥ |I|
pminζmin
pmax
δtrue, (4.22)
which completes the proof.
Remark 4.6. Suppose that assumptions 1-3 are satisfied. Note that any Bell value (of non-local
boxes) observed in a lab can be predicted by the rules of quantum mechanics and hence we set
δobsHP = δQ. (4.23)
Further, due to Theorem 4.5, we obtain
δtrue ≤ δQ pmax|I|pminζmin , (4.24)
where ζmin, pmin and pmax depend on both |I| and ε. The above inequality allows to set an upper
bound for ε (as |I| → ∞), as illustrated in the example of the chained Bell inequality below.
5 Example - the true versus the observed Bell value of the chained
inequality
5.1 The chained Bell inequality
The chained Bell inequality considers the bipartite scenario of two spatially separated parties Alice
and Bob. Let n ∈ Z+ be an arbitrary positive even integer. Let the sets UA := {1, 3, . . . , n− 1} and
UB := {2, 4, . . . , n} correspond to the measurement settings chosen by Alice and Bob, respectively.
Each measurement pair (u, v), where u ∈ UA, v ∈ UB, results in a binary outcome x ∈ {0, 1} for
13
Alice, and y ∈ {0, 1} for Bob. The chained Bell inequality is then written as [3]
1
n
( ∑
u,v:|u−v|=1
P (O = (x, y)|I = (u, v))[x⊕ y = 1] + P (O = (x, y)|I = (1, n))[x⊕ y = 0]
)
≥ 1
n
,
(5.1)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2 and [B] denotes the Iverson bracket taking value 1 when B is
true and 0 otherwise.
Remark 5.1. Note that out of the n2/4 possible measurement pairs, only n neighbouring pairs,
forming a chain, are considered in the inequality.
For clarity, we further label the pairs of inputs by the number of the edge in the chain (see Remark
5.1), i.e., instead of a pair (u, v), where u ∈ UA, v ∈ UB and |u − v| = 1, we set i := min{u, v}.
Similarly, the remaining pair in a chain (1, n) is denoted by n. Note that the true Bell value for
an arbitrary box P is then given by
δtrue(P ) =
1
n
(∑
i 6=n
P (O = (x, y)|I = i)[x⊕ y = 1] + P (O = (x, y)|I = n)[x⊕ y = 0]
)
, (5.2)
while the observed value is of the form
δobsAB(P ) =
∑
s 6=n
P (S = s)P (O = (x, y)|I = s, S = s)[x⊕ y = 1]
+ P (S = n)P (O = (x, y)|I = n, S = n)[x⊕ y = 0].
(5.3)
We recall that results observed in a lab are not better than the values predicted by the rules of
quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics violates (5.1) and provides a value of
δQ := sin
2(pi/2n), (5.4)
which tends to 0, as n → ∞, with a rate of convergence 1/n2. This optimal quantum value is
obtained by measuring on the maximally entangled state |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉) with the measurement
settings defined by the bases {|α〉, |α + pi〉}, α ∈ pin{0, 2, . . . , n − 2}, for Alice and {|β〉, |β + pi〉},
β ∈ pin{1, 3, . . . , n− 1}, for Bob, where |·〉 = cos(·/2)|0〉+ sin(·/2)|1〉.
5.2 Value of chained Bell inequalities on boxes
While testing the chained Bell inequality, we do not distinguish between boxes with the same prob-
ability distributions for neighboring pairs of settings. Hence, we consider only two types of extremal
boxes: ideal or "bad". Any other box may be represented as a mixture of these boxes, due to the
characterization of the extremal boxes for this scenario in [14].
We call boxes ideal (Pideal) if they violate the chained Bell inequality (5.1) maximally and give
perfectly random bits (boxes Pideal play for the chained Bell inequality the same role as PR-boxes play
for the CHSH inequality). With respect to the probability distributions significant for the chained
Bell expression, there is exactly one box violating (5.1) to 0 (compare with Remark 5.1). Precisely,
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this is the no-signaling box with structure of perfect correlations for the n − 1 neighboring pairs in
the sum and a perfect anti-correlation for the remaining pair n (see [14] for details). Then,
δtrue(Pideal) =
1
n
(∑
i 6=n
Pideal(O = (x, y)|I = i)[x⊕ y = 1]
+ Pideal(O = (x, y)|I = n)[x⊕ y = 0]
)
= 0.
(5.5)
In classical theory, there are no ideal boxes. The notion Pbad is used for these extremal (local
deterministic) boxes whose Bell value is at least 1/n, which means that there is at least one contra-
diction with probability distributions of ideal boxes (for neighboring pairs of settings). Apart from
purely classical boxes there are also other bad boxes which do not violate the chained Bell inequality
(5.1) (some of them even give randomness, but are inappropriate for the chosen inequality (5.1)).
Convex combinations of boxes Pbad are denoted by PBAD. By convexity,
δtrue(PBAD) ≥ 1/n. (5.6)
Remark 5.2. Any box P is a mixture of boxes which attain an optimal Bell value 0 and boxes which
do not violate the chained Bell inequality
P = (1− ΛP )Pideal + ΛPPBAD, ΛP ∈ [0, 1]. (5.7)
Corollary 5.3. The true Bell value for an arbitrary box P is estimated as follows:
δtrue(P ) ≥ ΛP /n, (5.8)
where ΛP is defined by Eq. (5.7).
Proof. Note that, according to Remark 5.2, we obtain
δtrue(P )
Eq. (5.7)
= δtrue ((1− ΛP )Pideal + ΛPPBAD)
= (1− ΛP )δtrue (Pideal) + ΛP δtrue (PBAD)
Eq. (5.5)
= ΛP δ
true (PBAD)
Eq. (5.6)
≥ ΛP /n.
(5.9)
At this point we explicitly state values of pmin , pmax and ζmin to be
pmin :=
p2r−
np2r+
, pmax :=
p2r+
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
, ζmin =
p2min
np2max
(5.10)
for r = log(n/2). The estimates come from [7] and Appendix 9. Even more accurate estimates are
given in [11].
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6 Composable distance in terms of the chained Bell value
Let I = i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, be any chosen input to a box P . To measure the distance between an
output bit of the box P (for Alice) and a fully random bit, we introduce the following quantity:
d(P ) = max
i
{di(P )}, (6.1)
where
di(P ) =
∣∣∣p(P )i (0)− 1/2∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣p(P )i (1)− 1/2∣∣∣ , (6.2)
and
p
(P )
i (x) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P (O = (x, y)|I = i) [x⊕ y = 0],
p(P )n (x) =
∑
y∈{0,1}
P (O = (x, y)|I = n) [x⊕ y = 1]
(6.3)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, x ∈ {0, 1}. Note that for boxes Pideal, which generate randomness, we have
pPideali (0) = p
Pideal
i (1) = 1/2 for every i. Due to Eq. (5.7), we further obtain
p
(P )
i (x) = ΛP p
BAD
i (x) + (1− ΛP )
1
2
, (6.4)
where pBADi is generated by boxes PBAD and, in the worst case, it is some deterministic function.
Theorem 6.1. Let d(P ) be defined by Eq. (6.1) for every box P of the form (5.7). Then
d(P ) ≤ ΛP ≤ nδtrue(P ). (6.5)
Proof. Let us bound the distance d from above. Following Eqs. (6.1) and (6.4), we obtain
d(P ) = ΛPmax
i
{|pBADi (0)− 1/2|+ |pBADi (1)− 1/2|} ≤ ΛP . (6.6)
Note that, due to Eq. (5.8) of Corollary 5.3, we obtain that
d(P ) ≤ ΛP ≤ nδtrue(P ), (6.7)
which completes the proof and indicates that, whenever the true Bell value is small, for an arbitrary
box P , the distribution of an output bit obtained from this box is close to uniform.
So far only a bipartite scenario has been discussed. However, in order to prove security (in a
composable way), we have to consider a third party, i.e. an eavesdropper Eve with her input w and
output z. We therefore introduce a tripartite box of the form
P (x, y, z|u, v, w). (6.8)
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The box satisfies the no-signaling constraints between the honest parties and Eve, i.e.
P (z|u, v, w) = P (z|w), P (x, y|u, v, w) = P (x, y|u, v) (6.9)
and
P (x|u, v, z, w) = P (x|u, z, w),
P (y|u, v, z, w) = P (y|v, z, w). (6.10)
It is then easy to see that
P (x, y|u, v) =
∑
z
P (z|w)P (x, y|z, u, v, w). (6.11)
Following the original protocol of Colbeck and Renner [7], the final random bit is just the output of
Alice, so it is enough to consider ∑
z
P (z|w)P (x|z, u, w) = P (x|u). (6.12)
For the given boxes we can calculate their Bell values. Finally, we obtain∑
z
P (z|w)δtrue|z,w = δtrue, (6.13)
which, together with Theorem 6.1, allows us to estimate the composable distance.
Definition 6.2. According to [2], the composable distance between fully random bits and bits x which
are derived from a box P (using a private source of weak randomness to generate inputs) is given by
dc(P ) =
∑
x
max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)
∣∣∣∣P (x|z, w)− 1|X|
∣∣∣∣ , (6.14)
where w and z are Eve input and output, respectively.
Proposition 6.3. The composable distance between a fully random bit and a bit obtained as an
outcome of a box P , whose Bell value is described in terms of Eq. (6.13), is not bigger than 2nδtrue(P ).
Proof. Since Alice output x is binary, then the composable distance dc, defined in Eq. 6.14, reads as
follows
dc(P ) =
∑
x
max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)
∣∣∣∣P (x|z, w)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 maxw ∑
z
P (z|w)
∑
x
∣∣∣∣P (x|z, w)− 12
∣∣∣∣
Eqs. (6.1)-(6.3)
≤ 2 max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)d (P|z,w) Eq.6.5≤ 2nmax
w
∑
z
P (z|w)δtrue|z,w(P )
Eq. (6.13)
≤ 2nδtrue(P ).
(6.15)
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Protocol
1. The honest parties Alice and Bob choose their measurement settings ui ∈ UA, vi ∈ UB
for each of the runs i = 1, . . . ,M where the input sets are of size |UA| = |UB| = n/2 (see
Section 5.1 for the precise definitions of UA, UB). To do so, in each run any of them uses
r = log(n/2) bits from an ε-SV source. Simultaneously, a sequence of M boxes is supplied.
2. They check that the cardinality |S| of the set S defined as
S := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} : |ui − vi| = 1 ∨ (ui, vi) = (1, n)} (7.1)
satisfies |S| ∈ [2M/n, 6M/n]. If not, they set the output to R = Fail and abort the protocol.
3. They verify that xi = yi for every i ∈ S and (ui, vi) 6= (1, n) or that xi 6= yi for i ∈ S,
(ui, vi) = (1, n). If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, they set R = Fail and abort.
4. They use further log |S| bits from the ε-SV source to choose f ∈ S which indicates the
position of the box, from which an output bit xf is recorded. The protocol outputs R = xf .
Figure 6: Randomness amplification protocol based on the chained Bell inequality.
Corollary 6.4. According to Proposition 6.3 and Remark 4.6, we obtain
dc(P ) ≤ 2δQ pmax
pminζmin
, (6.16)
where dc is a composable distance defined in Eq. (6.14). Further, the bound on dc(P ) is tending to 0
(meaning that full randomness of an output bit is guaranteed), as n→∞, for any
ε <
21/12 − 1
2
(
21/12 + 1
) ≈ 0.0144, (6.17)
which is proven in Appendix 9.
7 Randomness amplification protocol based on the chained Bell in-
equality
The protocol is given in Figure 6.
Remark 7.1. In Step 1 of the protocol, we require |S| ∈ [2M/n, 6M/n], since the probability of
uniformly choosing neighboring measurement settings is exactly P (i ∈ S) = 4/n, for every i ∈
{1, . . . ,M}.
Remark 7.2. In the proof we setM := (n/2)2.99 and take n such that log n and logM/n are integers.
We have that (2M)/n = (n/2)1.99 and (6M)/n = 3(n/2)1.99 and the number of boxes labeled by
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i ∈ S is slightly smaller than (n/2)2 (for large n). This ensures that the protocol does not abort
when run with the optimal quantum strategy while it does abort when run with classical boxes.
8 Analysis of the randomness amplification protocol
8.1 Parameters
The parameters of the general problem are denoted by m, n and a. Here m is the number of boxes
(runs) in the protocol (m = |S| in the above protocol based on the chained Bell inequality), n is the
number of input pairs that enter the inequality and a is the probability that in any run, a local box
attempting to mimic an ideal box is not detected by the measurement.
8.2 Attacks on the protocol due to the lack of independence
Consider that an adversary prepares a sequence of boxes of length m, and the honest parties obtain
bits from the source to input as measurement settings in the runs i = 1, . . . ,m. In the previously
considered scenario in [7], the assumption of independence between the source and the device implies
that the observation by the honest parties of the ideal sequence of measurement outcomes (i.e.,
compatible with the optimal violation) guarantees that the true Bell value of the devices used in
the protocol is also optimal. Moreover, the distribution of the further bits drawn to choose f ∈ S
(the position of the box from which the final output bit is drawn) is also independent of the device.
Therefore, when the tests in the protocol are passed, the boxes used must be optimal (i.e., as n→∞,
we have that δtrue → 0 faster than 1/n), and perfect randomness may be obtained from the output.
The relaxation of the independence assumption means that the sequence of boxes supplied by
the adversary may be correlated with the bits that the honest parties use in the protocol . This
implies that for any given sequence of inputs and corresponding observed outputs (I = i, O = o),
there is a class of box sequences that is compatible with this (i, o). We denote such a class in what
follows as a "cloud" of box sequences. Moreover, the bit string corresponding to position f is drawn
from the same SV source, which means that the SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(4.2) applies to it. We
will therefore consider attacks limited by the SV-condition as in the following remarks.
Remark 8.1. Correlations between measurement settings from the source and boxes are the same
as in Sections 4 and 5, so only the SV-condition for boxes (4.2) limits them.
Remark 8.2. We allow attacks in which correlations between sequences of |S| boxes and the number
f are only limited as in Eq.(8.27) which follows from the SV- condition for boxes.
8.3 The considered class of attacks and their symmetries
Within this paper we explore the attacks which consist of box sequences made of extremal boxes
for each run. By extremal box we mean either an ideal or a bad one (see Section 5 for the accurate
definitions). To explain what kind of symmetries occur in the considered class of attacks and to define
this class properly, we need to introduce the following notation. We say that a sequence of extremal
boxes is of type j if it contains exactly j bad boxes. Let Pj denote the probability of the class of box
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Deterministic box
Ideal box - the box which
maximally violates the
tested Bell inequality
Sequences of type 2
Figure 7: Possible arrangements of 2 bad boxes in a sequence of 4 boxes.
Figure 8: There are nj sequences of type j and of certain arrangement, e.g. in case of CHSH inequality,
16 different sequences are of type 2 and arrangement: 2 PR-boxes and 2 bad boxes. The edges with
mismatched correlations are marked in red.
sequences of type j. Obviously,
m∑
j=1
Pj = 1. (8.1)
We set the probability that the adversary supplies the box sequence consisting of only ideal boxes
to be zero, i.e., P0 = 0, these boxes generate perfect random output over all runs so that using such
boxes does not give any advantage to the adversary. Note that within a sequence of m boxes, j bad
boxes may be arranged in
(
m
j
)
different ways (see Fig. 7)
Let us consider the case when any bad box has exactly one contradiction when compared with
the correlations in an ideal box. In this case, there are
(
m
j
)
nj possible sequences of type j (since the
contradiction can happen in any one of the n different measurement pairs, see an example in Fig. 8).
Furthermore, consider the case when every sequence of type j is equally likely, i.e. appears with the
same probability rj , this gives that
Pj =
(
m
j
)
njrj . (8.2)
Recall that f ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is the number drawn using bits from the ε-SV source, which indicates
the position of a box in a sequence from which the final bit is recorded. Let an arbitrary sequence
of type k be denoted by Seqk. Then, we consider a family of the attack strategies given by the joint
probability of f and all possibly supplied sequences which satisfy, for a given parameter λ ∈ (0, 1],
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Figure 9: (Left) The probability of f is spread uniformly over bad boxes (cf. Eq. (8.3) with λ = 1).
(Right) The attack allows to take the final bit from an ideal box with probability (1 − λ), which is
spread uniformly over all ideal boxes. Moreover, f is distributed uniformly over the bad boxes with
probability λ ∈ (0, 1] (cf. Eq. (8.3) with an arbitrary parameter λ ∈ (0, 1]).
the following condition:
P (f = i|Seqk) =

λ
k for i being the position number
of bad box in Seqk
1−λ
m−k for i being the position number
of ideal boxe in Seqk.
(8.3)
Remark 8.3. Note that Pm > 0 and rm > 0 only in the case when λ = 1. Otherwise, when λ < 1,
we set Pm = rm = 0, since (according to the definition of an attack) f should indicate the position
of an ideal box with probability 1− λ, which is not possible while having no ideal box is a sequence.
Possible attacks are exemplified in Fig. 9.
8.4 Assumptions on the attack strategy
We assume that in the attack strategy, any bad box has exactly one contradiction when compared with
the correlations in an ideal box. That any attack strategy without this assumption is strictly weaker
is justified in Appendix 9, intuitively it is clear that using local boxes with more contradictions simply
decreases the probability of acceptance for the protocol (since the observed Bell value increases) in
comparison to using boxes with a single contradiction while yielding the same lack of randomness in
the output.
After taking the above considerations into account, we end with the following assumptions on
the particular class of attacks considered in this paper.
1. We assume that the attack consists of box sequences made of extremal boxes for each run, and
defer the consideration of the general attack consisting of a large box coherent over all runs for
future work.
2. We assume that the attack is symmetric in the sense that every box sequence of particular type
j (i.e., containing j bad boxes) appears with the same probability as in Eq.(8.2).
3. We assume that f , drawn from the source, is distributed uniformly over the bad boxes with
probability λ and uniformly over the good boxes with probability 1 − λ for any particular
sequence Seqk as specified in Eq. (8.3).
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8.5 Probability of acceptance of the protocol
Recall that a denotes the probability of not detecting a contradiction with the correlations of an ideal
box when measuring a bad box in a single run. Then, the probability of not aborting the protocol,
which happens if and only if the correlations in all the runs are compatible with the ideal correlations,
is described by the following expression:
P (ACC) =
m∑
k=1
Pka
k. (8.4)
Let us now compute a for the protocol based on the chained inequality. Note that, since only one
measurement can be performed, the probability that an edge with contradiction is measured is, in
case of uniform and independent inputs, as small as 1/n and can be even smaller in the case of inputs
taken from the source. Due to Theorem 4.5,
nδtrue
(
pminζmin
pmax
)
≤ δobs, (8.5)
so that the probability that an edge with contradiction is measured by Alice and Bob is bounded
from below by pminζmin/pmax, which in turn implies that
a = 1− pminζmin
pmax
. (8.6)
Note that when we consider the probability of not detecting that a subsequent box is local, it is a
conditional probability with all proceeding measurements in the condition (see Remark 4.3 in Section
4 about an arbitrary random variable e that is prior to the protocol).
In the rest of the paper, we will show that the protocol stays secure under the class of attacks
described in Section 8.4.
8.6 Main result
Let us set a = (1−pminζmin/pmax) (from Section 8.5) andm = |S| = (n/2)1.99 (which follows from the
requirements of the protocol and the rules of quantum mechanics, see Remark 7.2). We approximate
terms pmin, pmax and ζmin as we did in Eq. (5.10).
Let us denote by s the vector of input pairs (which form an edge in a chain), i.e. s = (s1, . . . , sm),
where si = (ui, vi) and, according to the protocol, ui and vi are drawn form an ε-SV source. Moreover,
let us fix an arbitrary value of the variable f taken form an ε-SV source, say f = f0, f0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Now, when f = f0 and s are fixed, the marginal box, from which the output of the protocol shall be
obtained, is of the form∑
ξ1
. . .
∑
ξf0−1
∑
ξf0+1
. . .
∑
ξm
Bs,f0 (ξ1, . . . , ξm, z|µ1, . . . , µm, w) NS= B(f0)s,f0 (ξf0 , z|µf0 , w) , (8.7)
where Bs,f0 is the mixture of extremal box sequences used for the considered class of the attacks (see
Sections 8.3 and 8.4) and adapted to both s and f = f0 (as indicated in the indexes), which is the
manifestation of the correlations between the ε-SV source and the device. Further, µ = (µ1, . . . , µm)
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and ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξm) are the vectors of inputs and outputs of the box, respectively, and (w, z) is the
input-output pair of an eavesdropper. Note that in the case of the honest parties, who follow the
protocol given in Section 7, µ is perfectly correlated with s.
The proof of the following lemma may be found in Appendix 9.
Lemma 8.4. Under the assumptions 1-3 outlined in Section 8.4), we obtain
∑
Seq
P (f = f0,Seq)1{position numbers of det. boxes in Seq}(f0) =
λ
m
, (8.8)
where Seq denotes an arbitrary sequence of extremal boxes which are product with one another and
the sum is over all sequences of this type ("det." is just the abbreviation for "deterministic"). Let us
also indicate that
1{position numbers of det. boxes in Seq}(f0) =
{
1, if the f0-th box in Seq is deterministic
0, if the f0-th box in Seq is ideal
. (8.9)
As a consequence, we have
m∑
f0=1
∑
Seq
P (f = f0,Seq)1{position numbers of det. boxes in Seq}(f0)
= λ.
(8.10)
Note that the parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] stems from the attack of Eve and determines the average probability
(over f) of not obtaining a random bit under the protocol given in Section 7.
Corollary 8.5. Let f = f0 and s be arbitrarily fixed. The fraction of boxes which are not ideal (i.e.
boxes which do not generate fully or almost fully random bits) within B(f0)s,f0 =
∑
Seq (Tri 6=f0Seq) is then
equal to λ/(mP (f = f0)). Indeed, note that Eqs. (8.8) and (8.9) immediately imply the following:∑
Seq
P (Seq with f0-th det. box|f = f0) = λ
mP (f = f0)
. (8.11)
Definition 8.6. Let us define the composable distance dc between fully random bits and final bits
generated within the protocol stated in Section 7 as follows:
dc =
m∑
f0=1
P (f = f0)dc|f0
(
B
(f0)
s,f0
)
, (8.12)
where dc|f0(B(f0)s,f0 ) are determined by Eq. (6.14) for every f0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence dc denotes the
distance in the case when f is known by the distinguisher, i.e. this is the composable distance with
public f .
Let us now state the definition of the secure protocol.
Definition 8.7. We define the probability of error as the following joint probability:
P (error) = P
(
dc > d
thr(n), P (ACC) > ACCthr(n)
)
, (8.13)
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where dthr(n) and ACCthr(n) are some thresholds for dc and P (ACC), respectively. We say that
a randomness amplification protocol is composably secure if there exist dthr(n) and ACCthr(n), both
converging to zero with increasing n, such that P(error)=0.
Let us now state the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 8.8. Assume that the correlations between the source and the device are constrained as in
Remarks 8.1 and 8.2. Under the assumptions on the attack strategy outlined in Section 8.4, the
probability of accepting the protocol from Section 7 is estimated as follows:
P (ACC) ≤ aλ/
(
p
log(m)
+
)
. (8.14)
Let us postpone the proof of Lemma 8.8 to Sections 8.9-8.11 in order to formulate now the main
result of this paper.
Theorem 8.9. Under the assumptions from Lemma 8.8, the protocol given in Section 7 is a compos-
ably secure randomness amplification protocol for every private ε-SV source with ε < 0.0132.
Proof. First of all, let us note that
dc
Eq. (6.14)
=
∑
x
max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)
∣∣∣∣P (x|z, w)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 maxw ∑
z
P (z|w)
∑
x
∣∣∣∣P (x|z, w)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 max
w
∑
z
P (z|w)
∑
x
∣∣∣∣∣∑
u
P (u)P (x|u, z, w)− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 maxw ∑
z
P (z|w)
∑
x
max
u
∣∣∣∣P (x|u, z, w)− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
(8.15)
Therefore, for fixed s and f = f0 (recall that si = (ui, vi) is the pair of inputs of Alice and Bob in
the i-th run of the protocol, while xi is the output for Alice in this run), we obtain the following
estimation:
dc|f0
(
B
(f0)
s,f0
) Eq. (6.14)
=
∑
xf0
max
w
∑
z
B
(f0)
s,f0
(z|w)
∣∣∣B(f0)s,f0 (xf0 |z, w)− 12 ∣∣∣
≤ 2max
w
∑
z
B
(f0)
s,f0
(z|w)
(
max
u
∣∣∣B(f0)s,f0 (xf0 = 0|u, z, w)− 12 ∣∣∣+maxu ∣∣∣B(f0)s,f0 (xf0 = 1|u, z, w)− 12 ∣∣∣ )
Corollary 8.5
= 2
λ
mP (f = f0)
max
w
∑
z
B
(f0)
s,f0
(z|w)
×
(
max
u
∣∣∣Pbad(xf0 = 0|u, z, w)− 12 ∣∣∣+maxu ∣∣∣Pbad(xf0 = 1|u, z, w)− 12 ∣∣∣
)
≤ 2λ
mP (f = f0)
(8.16)
and hence, according to Eq. (8.12), we have
dc ≤ 2λ, (8.17)
which means that for some small value of λ ∈ (0, 1], the composable distance dc is also small (on
average over f), while for the higher value of the parameter λ no proper upper bound on dc can be
guaranteed.
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Lets β be some small positive constant. Then, let
dthr(n) := 2n−β (8.18)
and
ACCthr(n) :=
(
1− p
12 log(n/2)
−
np
12 log(n/2)
+
) n−β
p
1.99 log(n/2)
+
. (8.19)
Obviously, limn→∞ dthr(n) = 0. The second bound converges to zero with increasing n for every ε
satisfying (0.5 − ε)12 − 21+β(0.5 + ε)13.99 > 0. By putting β to zero, we obtain the threshold value
for ε, i.e. 0 ≤ ε < 0.0132.
From Lemma 8.8 we know that P (ACC) ≤ aλ/
(
p
log(m)
+
)
. Lets us choose λ0 = n−β . There are two
possibilities, depending on the attacker’s choice of the parameter λ ∈ (0, 1]. If λ > λ0, then
P (ACC) ≤ aλ/
(
p
log(m)
+
)
< ACCthr(n), (8.20)
which implies that
P (error) = P
(
dc > d
thr(n), P (ACC) > ACCthr(n)
)
= 0. (8.21)
On the other hand, if λ ≤ λ0, then using Eq. 8.17 we obtain
dc ≤ 2λ ≤ 2n−β, (8.22)
so we also get
P (error) = P
(
dc > d
thr(n), P (ACC) > ACCthr(n)
)
= 0, (8.23)
which ends the proof.
To complete the security proof, it now remains to establish Lemma 8.8. To do this, we first need
to introduce some useful notation and the main concepts of our reasoning.
8.7 The notion of clouds
If we measure a bad box, we may either observe a contradiction with the correlations in an ideal box or
not. Not observing a contradiction does not guarantee that the box is ideal. This leads to the notion
of clouds, i.e., classes of boxes compatible with a given sequence of observations for a chosen sequence
of measurement inputs. If 1 denotes the event that a contradiction is observed and 0 denotes the
complementary event, the pattern of zeros and ones (of length m), together with the chosen sequence
of measurement settings, defines the cloud. Let a sequence of measurement settings be fixed. We
denote the cloud by Cl, where l = (l1, . . . , lm) and l1, . . . , lm ∈ {0, 1}. Note that |l| =
∑m
j=1 lj delivers
information about the number of detected contradictions, hence detected bad boxes. So there are at
least |l| bad boxes in the sequence which has been measured (see Figs. 10 and 11). Hence, in every
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Deterministic box
Ideal box
Such sequences appear with
probability .
Cloud 
detected
„bad” boxes
boxes with
no contradiction
at the measured
edge
Such sequences appear with
probability .
Such sequences appear with
probability .
Figure 10: The cloud C(1,1,0,0) (with 2 detected bad boxes).First two boxes are bad, which is known
after performing a measurement, the next two may be either ideal or bad boxes.
Measured edges 
Not measured edges 
Sequences 
of type 2 
Sequences 
of type 3 
Sequences 
of type 4 
Not measured edges  
 (with mismatched correlations) 
Figure 11: The cloud C(1,1,0,0) in case of CHSH inequality. First two boxes are bad, which is known
after performing a measurement, the next two may be either PR-boxes or bad boxes.
cloud Cl there are boxes of type q for q ≥ |l|, but only of certain arrangements, determined by the
performed measurements (see Fig. 10 for an example set of arrangements).
Note that detecting a contradiction gives certainty that the box is bad, as well as the knowledge
where exactly the contradiction appears. Not detecting a contradiction delivers only information
that there is no contradiction at the certain edge which has been measured. We may not exclude the
possibility that there is a contradiction at any other (non-measured) edge (which is also indicated in
the example in Fig. 10). It should be noted that clouds overlap at each other, i.e., the same sequence
of boxes may appear in multiple clouds. Let Ql = P (Cl) for |l| = l. Referring to the above analysis
(especially Section 8.3), we obtain
Ql =
m−l∑
s=0
(
m− l
s
)
(n− 1)srl+s for l ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (8.24)
Note that there are
(
m
l
)
clouds which appear with probability Ql .
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8.8 Constraints following from the SV-condition for boxes
We have that
plogm− ≤ P (f = i|a sequence of measurements) ≤ plogm+ , (8.25)
since f is a bit string drawn from the ε-SV source after the bits corresponding to the sequence of
measurements are drawn from the same source. The assumed SV-condition for boxes in Eq.(4.2) then
implies that
plogm− ≤ P (f = i|a sequence of measurements and outcomes) ≤ plogm+ (8.26)
for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sequence of
measurements and outcomes and its corresponding cloud. Suppose that measurement settings are
fixed and some outcomes are obtained. Then the appropriate cloud Cl is determined and we have
plogm− ≤ P
(
f = i|Cl
)
≤ plogm+ for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (8.27)
Let us set c+ := p
logm
+ /λ and k := |l|. Since P (ACC), given by Eq. (8.4), is defined in terms of
probabilities Pk (see Eq. (8.2)), condition (8.27) should also be rewritten in this way. Due to the
definition of attack (see Eq. (8.3)) and the properties of clouds, we obtain
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0. (8.28)
The derivation of Eq. (8.28) is given in Appendix 9.
8.9 Probability of acceptance as a linear program
The probability of acceptance can therefore be formulated as the following linear program. We want
to maximize the expression
m∑
k=1
Pka
k (8.29)
such that
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− c+
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0 (8.30)
for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
m∑
k=1
Pk ≤ 1,
m∑
k=1
−Pk ≤ −1, (8.31)
where the problem constraints follow from Eqs. (8.28) and (8.1). Obviously,
Pk ≥ 0 for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (8.32)
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A =

(
1
0
) (
n−1
n
)0
(1− c+)
(
2
1
) (
n−1
n
)1 (1
2 − c+
) (
3
2
) (
n−1
n
)2 (1
3 − c+
)
. . .
(
m
m−1
) (
n−1
n
)m−1 ( 1
m − c+
)
0
(
2
0
) (
n−1
n
)0 (1
2 − c+
) (
3
1
) (
n−1
n
)1 (1
3 − c+
)
. . .
(
m
m−2
) (
n−1
n
)m−2 ( 1
m − c+
)
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . .
(
m
0
) (
n−1
n
)0 ( 1
m − c+
)
1 1 1 . . . 1
−1 −1 −1 . . . −1

.
(8.34)
Note that the linear program written above is at once in its standard form, that is
max
{
~cT~x
}
such that A~x ≤ ~b
and the variables are non-negative ~x ≥ 0,
(8.33)
where ~x = (P1, . . . , Pm)T , ~c =
(
a, a2, . . . , am
)T , ~b = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1)T and A is an (m+ 2)×m matrix
of the form (8.34).
8.10 Dual problem
Let us consider the following dual problem:
min{~bT~y}
AT~y ≥ ~c
~y ≥ 0.
(8.35)
By linear programming duality, if either the primal or dual has an optimal solution, then both have
optimal solutions and the optimal values of the objective functions of these problems are equal.
In our case the dual problem is as follows:
min{ym+1 − ym+2} (8.36)
with constraints
k−1∑
r=0
(
k
r
)(
n− 1
n
)r ( 1
m
− c+
)
yk−r + ym+1 − ym+2 ≥ ak (8.37)
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
y1 ≥ 0, . . . , ym ≥ 0, ym+1 ≥ 0, ym+2 ≥ 0. (8.38)
We find the following feasible solution to the dual problem, formulated as Lemma 8.10, and proven
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in Appendix 9:
y1 =
a1/c+(1− a)(
1
c+
+ 1
) (
n−1
n
)1/c+ , y2 = y3 = . . . = ym = ym+2 = 0, ym+1 = a1/c+ . (8.39)
Lemma 8.10. Hypothesis (8.39) gives the feasible solution of the dual problem described by Eqs.
(8.36)-(8.38).
8.11 The optimal solution
In fact, Eq.(8.39) is not only a bound on the probability of acceptance but it is just an optimal
solution to the linear program. To prove that the above solution is optimal, we will show that the
objective functions of both, primal and dual, problems are equal.
Suppose that the solution of the primal problem is given by
Pu =
1
(1 + s(u, v))
, Pv =
s(u, v)
(1 + s(u, v))
, Pk = 0 for k /∈ {u, v}, (8.40)
where
s(u, v) =
un (c+ − 1/u)
v(n− 1) (1/v − c+) > 0 (8.41)
for u ≤ 1/c+ ≤ v. If we set
u =
1
c+
, v =
1
c+
+ 1, (8.42)
we obtain P1/c+ = 1 and P(1/c++1) = 0 and therefore
max
{
m∑
k=1
Pka
k
}
= a1/c+ = min {ym+1 − ym+2} , (8.43)
which indicates that the solution is indeed optimal. However, we should note that to be more accurate,
we should take u and v as natural numbers, i.e.
u =
⌊
1
c+
⌋
, v =
⌊
1
c+
⌋
+ 1. (8.44)
Note that, referring to Eq. (8.43) and the definition of c+, the proof of Lemma 8.8 is now complete.
9 Conclusion
We have studied the protocol of Colbeck and Renner [7] under relaxed assumptions which allow for
correlations between the Santha-Vazirani source with the devices used in the protocol. We have
proven, that in spite of such attacks, a non-zero range of parameter of ε-SV source allows for random-
ness amplification in the asymptotic limit of a large number of settings. More precisely, the protocol
(see Section 7) is composably secure for a restricted range of ε even if we admit
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(1) correlations between measurement settings and devices, only limited by the SV-condition for
boxes (see Sections 4 and 5),
(2) attacks such that, with probability equal to λ ∈ (0, 1] (describing the strength of the attack),
f is pointing to local boxes, i.e. boxes with no intrinsic randomness (correlations of sequences
of boxes with f are only limited by condition (8.27).
The detailed assumptions on the attack strategy are listed in Section 8.4. First of all, the device used
for the protocol is given as a mixture of sequences of boxes which are extremal and product with one
another. Moreover, we assume that all the attacks exhibit a certain kind of symmetry, i.e. sequences
of the same type (so with the same number of local boxes) are treated equally by the adversary,
further any local box within a single sequence of extremal boxes can be pointed by f with the same
probability. It is plausible, based on the experience gained while working with the SV-condition
for boxes, that the attack with certain symmetry conditions assumed within this paper is in fact
optimal. Nevertheless, it is not yet formally proven that we can admit the symmetry assumptions in
the attack without loss of generality. This is the aim for future work (cf. [13]). Another interesting
line of research, which is already in progress, aims to determine whether the attack can be physically
performed or not, i.e., whether the correlations between the weak source and the devices can be
created by the adversary physically without breaking the SV condition at this stage. Finally, an
important open question is whether the techniques used in this paper can be generalized to relax
the assumption of independence in the finite-device protocols of [2], [17] so as to obtain randomness
amplification for the entire range of ε, while tolerating a constant level of noise.
Appendix I
Let us derive the so-called backward SV-condition, determining that from a given bit of SV alone,
one can not guess perfectly any of of the bits that are preceding it in time order. Suppose that A and
B are some portions of bits from an ε-SV source of the same length |A| = |B|. Fix a¯, b¯ ∈ I, where
I is the set of possible measurement settings in the Bell expression. We assume that the probability
we consider is normalized, i.e.
∑
a∈I P (A = a) = 1. Let us prove that condition
pmin ≤ P (B = b¯|A = a¯) ≤ pmax (9.1)
implies that
ζmin ≤ P (A = a¯|B = b¯) ≤ ζmax, (9.2)
where
ζmin =
p2min
|I|p2max
and ζmax = 1− (|I| − 1)ζmin. (9.3)
Note that the definition of an ε-SV source (1.1) implies that
P (A = a¯, B = b¯) = P (A = a¯)P (B = b¯|A = a¯) ≥ p2min. (9.4)
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Let us now estimate
P (B = b¯) =
∑
a∈I
P (A = a,B = b¯) ≤ p2max|I|. (9.5)
We obtain
P (A = a¯|B = b¯) = P (A = a¯, B = b¯)
P (B = b¯)
≥ p
2
min
|I|p2max
, (9.6)
which proves the left side of Eq. (9.2). The formula for ζmax may be justified as follows:
P (A = a¯|B = b¯) = 1−
∑
a∈I\{a¯}
P (A = a|B = b¯)
≤ 1− ζmin(|I| − 1).
(9.7)
Let us restate the assumptions in the context of the chained Bell inequality:
1. Alice and Bob are spatially separated and share a no-signaling box with two input sets of size
n/2 and two binary outputs, which violates the chained Bell inequality up to δQ. They choose
their settings, each using r = log(n/2) bits from the main part of the ε-SV source (n is taken
to be an appropriate integer of the form 2r+1), i.e., the variable IHP describing their inputs, is
perfectly correlated with S as in Eq.(4.6) .
2. The SV-condition for boxes (4.2) is satisfied with pmin, pmax, ζmin given by (5.10).
3. The main part of the source is correlated with the device used by Alice and Bob. Another
part, called SVtest, is not directly correlated with a device, it is only used to check whether the
SV-condition for boxes is violated (details are described in Section 4.5).
Theorem 9.1. Assume that conditions 1-3 are satisfied. Then, ε < (21/12 − 1)/(2(21/12 + 1)))
(≈ 0.0144) guarantees full randomness of the output in the asymptotic scenario of a large number of
inputs n→∞.
Proof. Note that Eq. (6.16) in Corollary 6.4 immediately implies that, to verify that output bits are
fully random (dc(Bfinal)→ 0), it is enough to show that
∆ := δQ
2pmax
pmin
ζmin → 0, as n→∞. (9.8)
Following Eqs. (5.4), (5.10), we obtain
∆ = 2 sin2
( pi
2n
) pmax
pmin
p2min
np2max
≤ 2
( pi
2n
)2 np3max
p3min
=
(
pi2
2
)
1
n
p3max
p3min
=
(
pi2
2
)
1
n
p6r+(
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
)3 n3p6r+p6r− =
(
pi2
2
)
n2p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (n− 1)p2r−
)3 .
(9.9)
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Setting n = 2r+1, we have
∆ =
(
pi2
2
)
4r+1p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (2
r+1 − 1) p2r−
)3 . (9.10)
Let us now consider the asymptotic scenario of a large number of settings r →∞,
lim
r→∞
4r+1p12r+
p6r−
(
p2r+ + (2
r+1 − 1) p2r−
)3 = 0, (9.11)
which imposes that ε is bounded as
ε <
21/12 − 1
2
(
21/12 + 1
) ≈ 0.0144. (9.12)
Therefore, for the range 0 ≤ ε < (21/12 − 1)/(2(21/12 + 1)), we obtain a random output in the
asymptotic scenario of a large number of inputs.
Remark 9.2. The threshold is in fact slightly bigger (precisely it is (21/6(2−c)−1)(2(21/6(2−c) +1)) ≈
0.0162 where c solves H(c/2) = 1/2 for the binary entropy H), which can be proven with more
accurate approximations for pmin, pmax and ζmin, obtained by using the Ky Fan norm (see [11]), i.e.,
in the regime of large n
pmin =
p2r−
p2r− + 2rp
(2−c)r
+ p
cr−
, pmax =
p2r+
p2r+ + 2
rp
(2−c)r
− pcr+
. (9.13)
Appendix 2
Let us justify that to prove that the protocol is safe it is enough to consider boxes with either zero or
one contradiction with the correlations of ideal boxes. It should be noted that using bad boxes with
more than one contradiction simply decreases the probability of acceptance P (ACC) for the protocol,
making the observed Bell value bigger. We now show that the attack with bad boxes possessing
more than one contradiction can be improved by replacing these boxes with 1-contradiction boxes.
There is now only one more issue that needs attention. Due to the symmetry assumption, on which
our analysis is based, we need to replace boxes in such a way, that the final ensemble is symmetric.
Fortunately, it can be easily achieved. Indeed, suppose that any box with k contradictions on edges
e1, . . . , ek is replaced (with probability 1/k) by one of boxes with exactly one contradiction at one
of edges e1, . . . , ek. Then, if we assume that all boxes with k contradictions are equally likely and
are treated as described above, we will obtain the symmetric ensemble used in the main text, which
justifies that constraints used in linear programming remain the same.
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Appendix 3
Proof of Lemma 8.4. Let us write shortly 1{p.n.d.b.Seq} for the function 1{position numbers of det. boxes in Seq}.
Note that
∑
Seq
P (f = f0, Seq)1{p.n.d.b.Seq}(f0) =
m∑
k=1
∑
Seqk
P (f = f0, Seqk)1{p.n.d.b.Seqk}(f0), (9.14)
where Seqk denotes an arbitrary sequence of type k (see Section 8.3, where the structure of the
considered class of the attacks is explained). Let us also recall that, according to our assumptions
summarized in Section 8.4, every sequence of type k is equally likely, i.e. appears with the same
probability rk. We further obtain
m∑
k=1
∑
Seqk
P (f = f0, Seqk)1{p.n.d.b.Seq}(f0) =
m∑
k=1
∑
Seqk with det. f0-th box
P (f = f0|Seqk)P (Seqk)
Eq. (8.3)
=
m∑
k=1
∑
Seqk with det. f0-th box
λ
k
rk =
m∑
k=1
λ
k
rk
(
m− 1
k − 1
)
nk,
(9.15)
where there are
(
m−1
k−1
)
arrangements of k deterministic boxes within a sequence of m boxes, when
one of them has the already fixed position (in the f0-th place). Finally, we obtain
m∑
k=1
λ
k
rk
(
m− 1
k − 1
)
nk
Eq. (8.2)
=
m∑
k=1
λ
k
Pk(
m
k
)(m− 1
k − 1
)
=
λ
m
m∑
k=1
Pk
Eq. (8.1)
=
λ
m
, (9.16)
which completes the proof Eq. (8.8) and hence also the proof of Lemma 8.4.
Appendix 4
Here, we derive certain constraints on the linear program, given in Eq. (8.28) (see Section 8.9 for
the complete formulation of this linear program). Recall that k := |l|. Let us introduce disjoint sets
Tk+s, s ∈ {0, . . . ,m− k}, such that
⋃m−k
s=0 Tk+s = Cl. Every set Tk+s consists of sequences with k+ s
bad boxes and belongs to the cloud Cl, which simply means that the positions of k detected bad
boxes (with contradictions on measured edges) are fixed. Note that
|Tk+s| =
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)s. (9.17)
We now obtain
P
(
f = i|Cl
)
=
P (f = i, Cl)
Qk
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
P (f = i, Tk+s) =
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
∑
Seqk+s∈Tk+s
P (f = i|Seqk+s)P (Seqk+s). (9.18)
Let us assume that i is defining the position of some detected bad box, which means that i is defining
the position of a bad box in every Seqk+s belonging to cloud Cl. Following the definition of the attack
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(see Eq. (8.3)), as well as Eq. (9.17), we obtain
P
(
f = i|Cl
)
=
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
λ
k + s
∑
Seqk+s∈Tk+s
rk+s =
1
Qk
m−k∑
s=0
λ
k + s
rk+s|Tk+s| = 1Qk
m−k∑
s=0
λ
k + s
rk+s
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)s.
(9.19)
We further obtain (due to Eqs. (8.27) and (8.24))
m−k∑
s=0
λ
k + s
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s ≤ plogm+ Qk =
m−k∑
s=0
plogm+
(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s, (9.20)
which gives
m−k∑
s=0
(
λ
k + s
− plogm+
)(
m− k
s
)
(n− 1)srk+s ≤ 0. (9.21)
Then, according to the definition of Pj (see Eq. (8.2)), we have
1(
m
k
)
nk
m−k∑
s=0
(
λ
k + s
− plogm+
)(
k + s
k
)
(n− 1)s
ns
Pk+s ≤ 0. (9.22)
Finally we obtain
m−k∑
s=0
(
1
k + s
− p
logm
+
λ
)(
k + s
k
)(
n− 1
n
)s
Pk+s ≤ 0. (9.23)
Appendix 5
Proof of Lemma 8.10. To show feasibility, we need to prove that all m inequalities, given by Eq.
(8.37), are satisfied. The proof falls into three steps.
I. Let u ≤ v. Suppose that constraints (8.37) for k = u and k = v are equalities. Then, since
y2 = y3 = . . . = yn = yn+2 = 0, we have
u
(
n− 1
n
)u−1(1
u
− c+
)
y1 + ym+1 = a
u,
v
(
n− 1
n
)v−1(1
v
− c+
)
y1 + ym+1 = a
v.
(9.24)
Suppose that
u =
1
c+
and v =
1
c+
+ 1. (9.25)
Then, after subtracting Eqs. (9.24), we obtain
y1 =
a1/c+ − a1/c++1
c+
(
n−1
n
)1/c+ ≥ 0. (9.26)
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Further, we verify the remaining constraints:
k
(
n−1
n
)k−1 ( 1
k − c+
)
a1/c+(1− a)
c+
(
n−1
n
)1/c+ + a1/c+ ≥ ak (9.27)
II. Take k < 1/c+ and set 0 < l = 1/c+−k. Then k (1/k − c+) = 1−kc+ = lc+ and we may write
Eq. (9.27) as follows:
l(1− a)(
n−1
n
)l+1 + 1 ≥ a−l. (9.28)
To justify that this is true, we carry out the following reasoning. First, note that
(1− a) ≤ 1
n
, (9.29)
which follows from the fact that the minimal biased probability always is lower than the uniform
one. Hence, we obtain
a−l ≤
(
n− 1
n
)−(l+1)
. (9.30)
Now, it is enough to prove that
l(1− a)a−l + 1 ≥ a−l, (9.31)
since it implies Eq. (9.28), due to Eq. (9.30). Let us write Eq. (9.31) as follows:
l(1− a) + al − 1 ≥ 0. (9.32)
We have
d
dl
(
l(1− a) + al − 1
)
= (1− a) + al ln(a), (9.33)
where ln is the natural logarithm. Note that, since ln(a) < 0, we have
(1− a) + al ln(a) ≥ (1− a) + a ln(a). (9.34)
Let us verify if
(1− a) + a ln(a) ≥ 0, (9.35)
which is equivalent to
e
1−a
a ≥ e− ln(a) = 1
a
. (9.36)
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Using the Maclaurin series expansion, we obtain
1 +
1− a
a
+
1
2!
(
1− a
a
)2
+
1
3!
(
1− a
a
)3
+ . . . ≥ 1
a
(9.37)
which is obviously true. Hence, the value of first derivative is positive for every natural l,
which means that the function on the left hand side of (9.32) is monotonically increasing. As
a consequence, it is also non-negative, since for l = 1 it is equal to zero. This completes the
verification of the constraints for k < 1/c+.
III. Now, let k > 1/c+ + 1. Set l˜ + 1 = k − 1/c+ > 0. Analogously to the previous case, we may
rewrite Eq. (9.27) in the following form:
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)
(
n− 1
n
)l˜
≥ 0. (9.38)
Due to Eq. (9.29), we obtain
al˜ ≥
(
n− 1
n
)l˜
, (9.39)
which implies that to prove Eq. (9.38), it is enough to show that
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜ ≥ 0. (9.40)
We obtain
d
dl˜
(
1− al˜+1 − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜
)
= −al˜+1 ln(a)− (1− a)al˜ − (1− a)(l˜ + 1)al˜ ln(a)
≥ al˜ (−a ln(a)− (1− a)− 2(1− a) ln(a)) .
(9.41)
The derivative is positive, i.e.
−a ln(a)− (1− a)− 2(1− a) ln(a) ≥ 0 (9.42)
if
ln
(
1
a
)
≥ 1− a
2− a. (9.43)
Note that it is enough to verify that
1
a
≥ e1−a (9.44)
and this is easily verified by the series expansions of 1/(1−x) and exp(x). Since, we established
positivity of the first derivative for every natural l, we know that the function on the left hand
side of Eq. (9.40) is increasing. As a consequence, the function is also non-negative, which
follows from the result for l = 1, namely that 1− a2 − 2(1− a)a = (1− a)2 ≥ 0.
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